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Abstract—The rapid growth in the volume and importance of 
web communication throughout the Internet has heightened the 
need for better security protection. Security experts, when 
protecting systems, maintain a database featuring signatures of a 
large number of attacks to assist with attack detection. However, 
used in isolation, this can limit the capability of the system as it is 
only able to recognise known attacks. To overcome the problem, 
we propose an anomaly based intrusion detection system using 
an ensemble classification approach to detect unknown attacks 
on web servers. The process involves removing irrelevant and 
redundant features utilising a filter and wrapper selection 
procedure. Logitboost (LB) is then employed together with 
Random Forests (RF) as a weak classifier. The proposed 
ensemble technique was evaluated with some artificial datasets 
namely NSL-KDD, an improved version of the old KDD Cup 
from 1999, and the recently published UNSW-NB15 dataset. The 
experimental results show that our approach demonstrates 
superiority, in terms of accuracy and detection rate over the 
traditional approaches, whilst preserving low false rejection 
rates. 
Index Terms—Anomaly detection, intrusion detection, data 
mining, classification, web attacks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE increasing number and frequency use of web-based 
applications and web servers have resulted in a greater 
necessity for effective security defence in both in home 
and enterprise networks. Many organisations realise the 
urgency of utilising security protection tools to preserve their 
computer servers and reduce the impact of catastrophic 
attacks. A comprehensive analysis carried out by Symantec 
[1] reveals that nearly one million new threats are released 
into the public network each day. The recent attack on 21st  
October 2016 [2] was specifically designed to target Dyn a 
major Internet infrastructure company. The attack is 
recognised as one of the largest attacks with millions of 
source IP addresses used to request DNS lookup. Dyn is 
 
M.H. Kamarudin is with the Cyber Security Centre, WMG, University of 
Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom (e-mail: hilmi_kamarudin@yahoo.com)  
C. Maple now is the Director of Research at the Cyber Security Centre, 
WMG, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom (e-mail: 
cm@warwick.ac.uk). 
T. Watson is the Director of the Cyber Security Centre at WMG, 
University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom (e-mail: 
tw@warwick.ac.uk). 
N. S. Safa is the Researcher of the Cyber Security Centre at WMG, 
University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom (e-mail: n.sohrabi-
safa@warwick.ac.uk). 
responsible for providing DNS service translations, that is 
translating human-friendly site names into machine-readable 
Internet addresses. The attack nearly brought down the entire 
US Internet service. Vulnerable Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices such as webcams and digital videos can be used to 
distribute malicious software and spam. Mirai is an example 
of software that was designed to exploit the vulnerabilities in 
IoT devices by infecting them. The infected devices were 
turned into slave or zombie devices and formed an army of 
bots that was used to perform large scale Distributed Denial of 
Services (DDOS) attacks from multiple different locations. 
The attacks caused outages and slowness for many of Dyn’s 
customers including Twitter, Paypal, CNN, and some 
businesses hosted by Amazon.com Inc. 
A more recent massive cyber-attack took place on 12th May 
2017 and major impact in a significant element of the UK’s 
National Heath Service (NHS), other health industries and 
created chaos in hospitals across England. Thousands of 
computers at hospitals and GPs surgeries became victims of 
global ransomware attacks, derivatives of the WannaCry 
attack, which are believed to have exploited a vulnerability 
first discovered by the National Security Agency (NSA) [3]. 
In particular, the attack exploited a vulnerability in the 
Windows Server Message Block (SMB) protocol and installed 
backdoor tools to deliver and run a WannaCry ransomware 
package.  
Although the Internet provides convenient real-time 
information services to the public, the potential threats to 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) need to be 
addressed more effectively and permanently [4]. To fortify the 
security aspects of web-based servers and systems, Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSs) can be used as a complimentary 
device to many existing security appliances such as password 
authentication, firewalls, access control and vulnerability 
assessments. 
An IDS is an application system or device that functions to 
identify either hostile activities or policy violation activities 
within a network. IDSs play an active role in network 
surveillance, as well as functioning as a network security 
guard and have been widely used in recent years as a network 
security component. They are employed to capture and 
analyse traffic movement and send an alarm when intrusive 
actions are detected. The alarm alerts the security analyst, who 
then takes necessary action. In general, IDSs can be classified 
as either a network-based IDS (NIDS) or as a host-based IDS 
(HIDS) to recognise signs of intrusion [5]. The classification 
is based on whether the placement of the IDS is intended 
either to capture traffic for the whole network or only for a 
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specific host [6]. In NIDS, the IDS is normally installed 
before and after the firewall so that traffic for the whole 
network segment is captured. In the case of HIDS, the IDS 
focuses on a specific host to examine packets, logs and system 
calls. As such, HIDS are more suitable for identifying internal 
attacks compared to NIDS [7].  
According to [8], there are two types of IDS: The Signature 
Based Detection System (SBDS) and the Anomaly Based 
Detection System (ABDS). In SBDS, a set of previously 
defined rules are stored in databases and used to identify 
known attacks. Given that the SBDS technique relies on 
consistent signature updates, it is unable to detect unknown or 
new attacks [9]. Consequently, such attacks could pass 
through the system undetected. On the other hand, the ABDS 
approach is based on analysis of normal behaviour traffic as a 
baseline of general usage patterns. Fundamentally, ABDS is 
based on the assumption that any traffic that deviates from 
normal patterns can be identified as malicious traffic [10]. The 
main advantage of this approach is its ability to identify new 
or unknown attacks. The presented detection approach 
presented in this research leverages the strength of ABDS. 
The ensemble classification technique is a data mining 
approach that is based on statistical learning theory. It 
involves a combination of several classifiers to obtain 
improved performance [11]. The ensemble method is divided 
into 3 main approaches: (i) bagging, (ii) stack generalisation 
and (iii) boosting. Bagging, often otherwise referred to as 
‘bootstrap aggregating’, aims to improve detection accuracy 
by fusing the outputs of learned classifiers into a single 
prediction. For instance, the Random Forests (RF) algorithm 
achieves high classification accuracy by fusing random 
decision trees using the bagging technique. Stack 
generalisation, or ‘stacking’, involves the combination of 
predictions from several learning algorithms. The prediction 
output from base-level classifiers is used to achieve a high 
level of generalisation accuracy. The advantage of this 
algorithm is that it can significantly enhance the 
generalisation of the learning algorithm and can thereby 
produce better results than when using single classifiers [12]. 
In this research, an anomaly based intrusion detection that 
recognises web attacks run via a HTTP protocol and which 
uses an ensemble based classification approach is proposed. 
The Logitboost algorithm is used as a meta-classifier together 
with Random Forests (RF) as a weak classifier. The 
performance of the proposed technique is evaluated in the 
context of intrusion detection. The remainder of this paper is 
organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work on 
intrusion detection and the proposed approaches are discussed 
in Section 3. The experimental results are presented in Section 
4 while Section 5 concludes and outlines future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In this section, we discuss related work in the areas of 
feature selection and data mining algorithms used for 
choosing a classifier for attack detection. 
A. Feature Selection 
Currently, the two general methods used in feature 
selection are the filter-based and wrapper-based [13] 
approaches. Filter-based subset evaluation (FBSE) was 
introduced to overcome the redundant feature issue that arises 
when using filter-ranking [14]. It examines the whole subset 
in a multivariate way, selects relevant features and explores 
the degree of relationship between them. FBSE is a heuristic-
based method that uses probabilities and statistical measures 
to search for and evaluate the usefulness of all the features 
that have been identified. Alternatively, wrapper-based subset 
evaluation (WBSE) uses a classifier to estimate the worth of 
each feature subset. Usually, WBSE has better predictive 
accuracy than FBSE. This is because the selection approach is 
optimised when evaluating each feature subset with a 
particular classification algorithm. Conversely, most of the 
time the wrapper-based approach uses a classification 
algorithm to evaluate each set of features. This has made it 
excessively expensive to execute. Moreover, when dealing 
with a large database that consists of many features the 
wrapper can become uncontrollable [15]. Wrappers are also 
associated with the classifier’s algorithm and that makes it 
more difficult to shift from one classifier to another since the 
selection process needs total re-initiation. Unlike wrappers, 
the selection criteria of filters use distance measures and 
correlation functions [16]: as such it does not require re-
execution for different learning classifiers. The result of this is 
that its execution is much faster than that of wrapper-based 
approaches. Filters are best suited to large database 
environments that contain many features. Researchers have 
often used the filter, as an alternative to the wrapper, since the 
latter is expensive and time-consuming to run. 
B. Classification 
  Classification used in IDSs uses a supervised approach 
that has the capability to differentiate unusual data patterns, 
and this makes it suitable for identifying unseen attack 
patterns [17].  A classifier will gather knowledge by training 
the pre-classified sample that represents classes. It can act as a 
predictor for some unknown samples or a descriptor for 
classified samples. Furthermore, classification has been 
widely used due to its strong performance in identifying 
normal structure accurately, thereby contributing towards its 
low rates of false detection [18]. Many previous works, 
employing method such as Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, 
Random Forests, Support Vector Machines (SVM) and 
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), have used a single classifier in 
the field of intrusion detection [17], [19], [20], [21] and [22]. 
In spite of each classifier having good detection accuracy in 
detecting specific threats, the processing time varies 
depending on the complexity of the algorithm used in data 
processing. This leads to a longer processing time if a large 
number of instances are involved in building the detection 
model. This can also lead to higher misclassification rates 
[23]. Furthermore, certain classifiers take longer processing 
time in building a detection model. Generally better detection 
results can be achieved using complex algorithms performing 
deep analysis of the data instances. For example, MLP can 
achieve better detection accuracy when compared to SVMor 
the decision tree algorithm J48 [24], but at the same time, 
MLP is can be very time-consuming algorithm when 
compared to RF or the decision-based DTable and J48 [25]. 
RF is an ensemble approach which consists of many decision 
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trees (such as J48), and this comes with the advantage that it 
can process both numerical and categorical data in a way that 
produces a finer prediction output than J48 alone. Thus, the 
RF classifier is preferable over the individual J48. 
C. Boosting Algorithms 
Boosting is mainly used to boost a weak classifier or weak 
learner with the aim of achieving a higher accuracy classifier. 
In other words, boosting can be considered a meta-learning 
algorithm. The incorrectly classified instances from the 
previous model are used to build an ensemble. Weak 
classifiers such as decision stump, which is based on a 
decision tree with a root node and two leaf nodes, are often 
used as a boosting technique [26]. Adaboost (Adaptive 
boosting) is the most popular boosting algorithm that was first 
introduced in [27]. The high degree of accuracy which comes 
along with using this algorithm has attracted researchers to 
use it in IDS, see [28], [29] and [30].  
In [28], the author proposed Adaboost, with a decision 
stump as a weak classifier. The noise and outliers existing in 
the dataset are initially removed by training the full data. The 
sample data that contained high weight is classified as noise 
and outliers. In that work, although the detection rate achieved 
was almost 92%, the false alarm rate was still 8.9%. 
Subsequent research [29] considers choosing the right weak 
classifier for Adaboost. In the work, the following four 
classifiers are compared: NNge (Non-Nested generalized 
examplars); JRip (Extended Repeated Incremental Pruning); 
RIDOR (Ripple-Down Rule); and Decision Tables as a base 
classifier for Adaboost. The proposed conjunction of 
Adaboost with NNge received the highest detection rate in 
detecting user to root (U2R) and remote to local (R2L) types 
of attack while a combination of Adaboost with Decision 
Tables was found to be efficient in detecting Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks. More recent work, [30], details a similar 
concept to [28]. The author tested a naïve Bayes algorithm 
utilised as a weak classifier. Although the proposed algorithm 
could achieve a 100% detection rate with respect to DoS 
attacks, the overall performance (84% detection rate with 
4.2% false alarm rate) is still much lower when compared to 
[28].  
The introduction of the Logitboost algorithm [31] was 
designed as an alternative solution is to address the limitations 
of Adaboost in handling noise and outliers. The Logitboost 
algorithm uses a binomial log-likelihood that changes the loss 
function linearly. In contrast, Adaboost uses an exponential 
loss function that changes exponentially with the classification 
error. This is the reason why Logitboost tends to be less 
sensitive to outliers and noise. To the best of our knowledge, 
no research to date has investigated the performance of the 
Logitboost algorithm in the field of ABDS environment. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
In this research, our anomaly detection approach consists of 
two parts:  pre-processing (hybrid feature selection) and data 
mining (boosting classification algorithm). Fig. 1 presents the 
proposed anomaly detection model in detecting web attacks. 
 
Fig. 1. The Proposed Anomaly Detection Model 
A. Pre-processing 
In the pre-processing step, we adopt the Hybrid Feature 
Selection (HFS) [32] technique to leverage the strengths of 
both the filter and wrapper approaches. In addition, the 
proposed filter-based subset evaluation (FBSE) was utilised to 
resolve the filter-ranking problem where redundant features 
were identified. 
Fig. 2.  Hybrid Feature Selection (HFS) design [32] 
Fig. 2 illustrates the process flow for building HFS, which 
can be classified into 3 stages as follows: 
In Stage 1, the process starts with the filter-subset 
evaluation. It processes the original features M and produces a 
new set L of reduced features, where L ⊆ M. We propose the 
Correlation Feature Selection (CFS) approach for use in Phase 
1 due to its robustness in removing redundant and irrelevant 
features. This approach overcomes the issue of redundant 
features because in CFS the relationship between features is 
measured using equation (1). Additionally, the reduced 
features in feature ranking are usually defined without the 
need to perform further examination (for example, 
information gain and gain ratio). The CFS is an intelligible 
filter algorithm that evaluates subsets of features based on 
heuristic evaluation functions. The evaluation is based on the 
hypothesis “A good feature subset is one that contains 
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4 
features highly correlated with the class, yet uncorrelated 
with each other” [15]. 𝑀𝑠 = 𝑘𝑟𝑐𝑓𝑘 + 𝑘 𝑘 − 1 𝑟𝑓𝑓                                                                                                       (1) 
Equation (1) shows how the merit function, M, is used to 
select a subset S containing k number of features. Both 
redundant and irrelevant features are determined by the rcf 
which represents the mean of the relationship of each feature 
to its class while rff is the mean of the relationship among the 
features. An exhaustive search is not feasible in large datasets 
[15] due to the high complexity. As such, we employ heuristic 
search techniques and chose a genetic algorithm as the search 
function. This was because our experiment reveals that the 
genetic algorithm gives a global optimum solution and is more 
robust than particle swarm optimisation (PSO), best-first and 
greedy methods. Furthermore, at this stage it is crucial to help 
to truncate the computational effort using the wrapper 
approach as it only deals with a reduced set of features 
compared to the original set of features.  
In Stage 2, the reduced feature set L gathered from the 
FBSE was combined with the WBSE method to produce the 
final set of optimal features K, where K ⊆ L ⊆ M. The 
proposed filter and wrapper hybridisation approach leverages 
the strengths of each to produce a much better result in terms 
of accuracy, false alarm rate and fewer redundant and 
irrelevant features. This is due to the fact that the filter 
approach cannot find the best available subset, since it is less 
dependent on the classifier. On the other hand, the wrapper 
approach is proven to be more effective and produces better 
accuracy. Nevertheless, it is computationally expensive when 
dealing with a large dataset. Thus, by leveraging the strengths 
of both methods, we combined them together to form a hybrid 
feature selection approach. We use the Random Forests (RF) 
classifier in WBSE to evaluate the selected features using a 
genetic search and determine the final K feature subset. The 
searches would continue to train a new model for each subset 
and stop once the final optimum subset is found. 
Stage 3 is called the classification stage. In this stage, the 
final optimum subset K, produced by WBSE, was tested by 
the RF classifier with 10-fold cross validation. RF consists of 
many decision tree classifiers. Each decision tree was 
constructed from the different original dataset samples. The 
outputs were chosen based on votes obtained from each tree 
that indicated the tree’s decision concerning the class object. 
The most votes for the object are from the best individual 
trees.  
The feature selection procedures were conducted using the 
training data that contained a mixture of normal and attack 
traffic. The significance of features are measured using a 
correlation function in the filter process, while in the wrapper 
process, a classification algorithm is used. The features that 
achieve high merit scores and are highly correlated to the 
class are selected. On the other hand, those features that are 
highly correlated with other features indicates are redundant, 
and as such these features are removed in the stages 1 and 2. 
Further analysis on the features selected by the proposed 
method are discussed in the next section. 
B. Proposed Ensemble Classification Method 
In this section, the proposed ensemble classification method 
based on a boosting algorithm is described. We use the 
boosting algorithm named Logitboost as the meta-classifier 
for boosting classification. From preliminary experiments and 
examination of the literature, we found that this algorithm is 
more suitable for handling noisy and outlier data over the 
widely used Adaboost algorithm. Consider a training data set 
with N samples and divided into two classes (in this study the 
two classes are abnormal and normal). The two classes are 
defined as y ∈ {-1,+1}, i.e. samples in class y=1 are instances 
of normal traffic while y=-1 are the samples of abnormal, or 
attack traffic. Let the set of training data be {(x1, y1),….., 
(xi,yi),… (xn,yn)}, where xi is the feature vector, and yn is the 
target class. The Logitboost algorithm consists of the 
following steps [31]: 
1) Input data set N= {(x1, y1),….., (xi, yi),… (xn, yn)}, 
where xi∈ X and yi ∈ Y = {-1,+1}. Input number of 
iterations K. 
2) Initialized the weights wi= 1/N, i= 1, 2, …, N; start 
committee function F(x)=0 and probabilities 
estimates P(xi)=1/2. 
3) Repeat for k= 1,2,…, K: 
a. Calculate the weights and working response 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑝(𝑥𝑖)(1 − 𝑝 𝑥𝑖 )                                                          (2) 
 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑝(𝑥𝑖)𝑝(𝑥𝑖)(1 − 𝑝 𝑥𝑖 )                                                           (3) 
b. Fit the function fk (x) by a weighted least squares 
regression of zi to xi using weights wi. In this 
research, we use random forests as weak classifier 
to fit the data using weights wi. 
c. Update 𝐹 𝑥 ← 𝐹 𝑥 + 12 𝑓𝑘 𝑥                                                       (4) 
     and 𝑝 𝑥 ← 𝑒! !𝑒! ! + 𝑒!! !                                                           (5) 
4) Output the classifier: 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛   𝐹 𝑥 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛   𝑓𝑘(𝑥)!!!!                         (6) 
At this point, sign [F (x)] is a function that has two possible 
output classes: 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛   𝐹 𝑥 = 1, 𝑖𝑓  𝐹 𝑥 < 0−1, 𝑖𝑓  𝐹 𝑥 ≥ 0         (7) 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, we present the datasets used for evaluation, the 
number of samples used in our experiments, experimental 
tools employed in our proposed approach, and the evaluation 
metrics adopted to measure the performance of the proposed 
approach. 
A. Dataset Description 
The proposed method was analysed through experiments 
using two different datasets: the NSL-KDD dataset and the 
UNSW-NB15 dataset. We made use of publicly available 
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labelled datasets simply to avoid problems with recorded 
traffic from the real environment, outlined in [33]. Both 
datasets are available online and have been comprehensively 
used as a standard benchmark by many researchers in this 
field [44-53]. The NSL-KDD dataset is the traditional and 
most commonly used dataset in this field. In essence, the 
dataset is a modified version of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, 
with some redundant traffic removed. In contrast, the UNSW-
NB15 dataset is a modern updated dataset, which claims to 
contain more realistic and modern attack types [34].  
The NSL KDD dataset was generated by [35], and based on 
the KDD 99 dataset generated as part of the DARPA 1998 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Evaluation dataset project 
created by Lincoln Lab [36]. The dataset was simulated using 
artificial data and generated in a closed network, where some 
of the network involves proprietary network traffic with 
manual injected attacks.  
The simulation is a replication of the medium size traffic 
found in US Air Force bases in collaboration with Air Force 
Research Laboratory (AFRL). Since KDD 99 suffered from 
some drawbacks, the dataset was revised in [35], where 
removing duplicate and redundant traffic in the dataset was 
removed. This makes it unsuitable for processing by the 
learner as learners tend to display a bias towards frequent 
data. NSL KDD has affected a further improvement by 
removing 78% and 75% of duplicated traffic in the training 
and testing data respectively. As presented in Table I, based 
on the reduced dataset generated, 4,500 and 5,641 instances in 
the training and testing dataset are from http traffic. There are 
four categories of class attack as below: 
Probe: A probe attack is an attempt to gather or learn specific 
information in a targeted network or host for reconnaissance 
reasons (e.g., port scanning). This type of attack is commonly 
used by an attacker to retrieve information from the machines 
connected inside the network where the host is vulnerable to 
this type of attack depending on the type of operating system 
or version of software installed or used. This kind of attack 
functions as a preliminary stage for an attacker before they 
launch an attack which purports to actually compromise the 
targeted network or host. This class of attack is the extremely 
common since it requires very little technical skill. Although 
there is no specific destruction to an organisation caused by 
these activities, they are still considered a serious threat due to 
the information obtained by the attacker, which is likely to be 
useful in launching any future attacks. 
Denial of Services (DoS): Denial of Services attacks are class 
of attack where an attacker sends a huge volume of request 
connections, normally with the intention of disrupting and 
paralysing the system server. In short, the attack encompasses 
destructive characteristics aimed at compromising the targeted 
network system infrastructure. One example of a DoS attack 
is when a web service is rendered unable to respond to 
legitimate users who need access because the server is flooded 
with innumerable connection requests. DoS attacks are 
classified based on the degree to which they cause 
unavailability of service to legitimate users. 
User to Root (U2R): The user to root attack is a type of 
attack during which an attacker exploits the administrative 
account to gain access to the root in an attempt to retrieve, 
modify or abuse important resources inside the system. Social 
engineering is a common method used as part of this attack, 
involving the attacker gaining access to the victim’s account 
and exploiting a vulnerability in order to gain access as a 
super user. An example of this kind of attack is buffer 
overflow, where the attacks is the cause of regular 
programming errors or system settings mistake. 
Remote to User/ Remote to Local (R2L): Remote to user 
attacks are also known as remote to local attacks. This type of 
attack happens when an attacker exploits a vulnerability in the 
victim’s machine over the network to illegally gain local 
access as an authorised user. The privilege of this successful 
attack allows the attacker to gain the status of an authorised 
user to perform legitimate activities. These common attacks 
usually involve social engineering. Commonly, the attacker 
uses a trial-and-error approach by determining the user’s 
password perhaps through some scripting method such as a 
brute force attack. Some sophisticated approaches involve the 
attacker successfully installing malicious tools with the 
intention of capturing the user password before using it to 
gain access to the system. 
The UNSW-NB 15 was simulated by [34] using the IXIA 
PerfectStorm tool in the Cyber Range Lab at the Australian 
Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS). The dataset was generated 
based on the combination of synthetic attack activities along 
with real modern normal behaviours. Fig. 3 illustrates the test 
bed configuration of the UNSW-15 dataset. The full dataset 
contains captured raw traffic of 100GB with nine synthetic 
types of attacks: Backdoors, DoS, Analysis, Fuzzers, Generic, 
Worms, Reconnaissance, Shellcode and Exploits. 
 
Fig. 3. UNSW-NB15 Testbed Network Architecture [34] 
The features and the class labels are generated by Argus 
and Bro-IDS tools in conjunction with twelve algorithms. The 
dataset consists of both combination traffic on synthetic attack 
behaviours and real normal activities. The total traffic 
captured is 2,540,044 where parts of this data are divided into 
two sets (training and testing), which consisting of 175,341 
and 82,332 instances of traffic respectively. In these sets of 
traffic, 8,287 instances in the training data and 18,724 
instances in the testing data are based on http traffic as 
presented in Table II. 
TABLE I: DISTRIBUTION OF HTTP TRAFFIC FOR NSL-KDD DATASET  
NSL-KDD 
Dataset 
Training Data Testing Data 
Normal Attack Normal Attack 
3,817 683 2,856 2,785 
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TABLE II: Distribution of HTTP Traffic for UNSW-NB 15 Dataset 
  
UNSW-NB 
15 
Dataset 
Training Data Testing Data 
Normal Attack Normal Attack 
4,013 4,274 5,348 13,376 
 
B. Experimental Settings 
The detection performance of the proposed ensemble 
approach applied to both the NSL-KDD and the UNSW-
NB15 datasets are presented in this section. The experiments 
were conducted on a 2.4 GHz Pentium Core i7 with 8GB 
RAM running the Windows 7 operating system.  
In this study, the results are obtained using the default 
setting of Weka data mining and machine learning software 
(version 3.8) [37] along with MySQL for the database 
management system. Weka is open source software written in 
Java and developed at University of Waikato, New Zealand. It 
comprises many machine learning and data mining techniques 
used for knowledge discovery. 
C. IDS evaluation method 
There are number of performance metrics that can be used to 
evaluate the performance of an IDS. The most commonly 
used metrics in the field of intrusion detection are focused on 
the false alarm rate (FAR), detection rate (DR) and accuracy 
(ACC) [38]. In this research, we had employed the same 
performance metrics evaluate our proposed methods: 
a) False Alarm Rate (FAR): This quantifies the amount 
of benign traffic detected as malicious traffic 
b) Detection Rate (DR): This quantifies the proportion 
of detected attacks among all attack data 
c) Accuracy (ACC): This measures in percentage form, 
where instances are correctly predicted False  Alarm  Rate   FAR =    FPFP + TN                                  8  
 Detection  Rate   DR =    TPTP + FN                                                  9  
 Accuracy   ACC =    TP + TNTP + TN + FP + FN                       (10) 
 
D. Pre-processing of the NSL KDD and the UNSW-NB15 
datasets 
In the pre-processing phase, we adopted the HFS approach 
for both datasets to select the most prominent features. As 
presented in Tables III and IV, the original 41 NSL-KDD and 
the original 43 UNSW-NB15 features were reduced to 10 and 
5 respectively. This significant reduction of features has 
contributed to reducing the overall detection time during the 
experiment.  
As can be seen from Fig. 4 and 5, the reducing features 
through the use of HFS allow us to obtain slightly better 
performance in term of false positive rate, detection rate and 
accuracy rate over the original full features for both NSL 
KDD and UNSW-NB 15 datasets. This indicates that the HFS 
technique is suitable for removing irrelevant and redundant 
features residing in the datasets. 
 
TABLE III: Feature selection for NSL-KDD dataset 
 
TABLE IV: Feature selection for UNSW-NB 15 dataset 
 
Fig. 4. Comparison of performance between original and 
reduced features in the NSL-KDD dataset 
 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison of performance between full and reduced 
features in the UNSW-NB15 dataset 
0.13%	  
0.03%	  
99.60%	  
99.71%	  
99.82%	  
99.93%	  
0.00%	   20.00%	   40.00%	   60.00%	   80.00%	   100.00%	  
Original	  Feature	  
Salient	  Features	  (HFS)	  
Accuracy	  Rate	   DetecBon	  Rate	   False	  Alarm	  Rate	  
3.34%	  
0.75%	  
92.86%	  
99.99%	  
94.70%	  
99.63%	  
0.00%	   20.00%	   40.00%	   60.00%	   80.00%	   100.00%	  
Original	  Feature	  
Salient	  Features	  (HFS)	  
Accuracy	  Rate	   DetecBon	  Rate	   False	  Alarm	  Rate	  
Feature Selection 
Approach 
Number 
of 
Features 
Feature Selection 
Original Features 41 
f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f6, f7, f8, f9, f10, f11, 
f12, f13, f14, f15, f16, f17, f18, f19, f20, 
f21, f22 f23, f24, f25, f26, f27, f28, f29, 
f30, f31, f32, f33, f34, f35, f36, f37, f38, 
f39, f40, f41 
Salient Features 
(Hybrid Feature 
Selection) 
10 f5, f23, f24, f29, f31, f33, f34, f35, f37, f39 
Feature Selection 
Approach 
Number 
of 
Features 
Feature Selection 
Original Features 43 
f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f6, f7, f8, f9, f10, f11, 
f12, f13, f14, f15, f16, f17, f18, f19, f20, 
f21, f22 f23, f24, f25, f26, f27, f28, f29, 
f30, f31, f32, f33, f34, f35, f36, f37, f38, 
f39, f40, f41, f42, f43 
Salient Features 
(Hybrid Feature 
Selection) 
5 f8, f25, f26, f29, f31 
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The final sets of features selected by the HFS process are the 
features that contributed most significantly to determining 
traffic behaviours. For instances in the NSL KDD dataset, 
DoS and Probe attacks are triggers when there are many 
connections involving to the same hosts. The significant 
features for observing these types of attacks are src_bytes, 
count and srv_count. Meanwhile, in an R2L attack, the 
attacker behaviour in accessing the local account mean that 
features such as src_bytes, same_srv_rate and 
dest_host_srv_count become relevant for attack detection. On 
the other hand, in UNSW NB-15, the TCP connection type 
round trip time “tcprtt” and SYN time between traffic 
“synack” features are significant in the identification of DoS 
attacks. Meanwhile the feature of response_body_len is 
important for recognising Reconnaissance attacks. The 10 
features selected by HFS in NSL KDD are: src_bytes, 
count,srv_count,same_srv_rate,srv_diff_host_rate,dst_host_sr
v_count,dst_host_same_srv_rate,dst_host_diff_srv_rate,dst_h
ost_srv_diff_host_rate and dst_host_srv_serror_rate. Further, 
the 5 features selected by HFS in UNSW-NB 15 are: sbytes, 
tcprtt, synack, dmean and response_body_len. In terms of 
significant features that contribute to recognising attack 
behaviour, our proposed HFS approach has successfully 
selected all significant features that are relevant to the attack 
types. 
TABLE V: Detection result derived by proposed approach for NSL-KDD 
testing dataset 
 
While the anomaly detection utilises data mining 
approaches, Logitboost classification is employed for 
detecting known and unknown attack traffic. For Logitboost 
combination, we choose RF as a base learner due to its 
robustness in dealing with noise and outliers data and its 
superior performance over other classifiers.  
To test the robustness of our proposed approach, we have 
ensured that the attack traffic in both training and testing data 
were significantly different. In simple terms, this means that 
the sample attack traffic used in the training data is not itself 
part of the testing data. In addition, we made sure that the 
proportion of attack traffic in the testing data was higher than 
the attack traffic in the training dataset. For example, in this 
research 2,785 and 13,376 instances of attack traffic used in 
the testing data were available for detection, whilst 683 and 
4,274 instances of attack traffic were used to build the 
classification model in the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15 
training sets respectively. 
As presented in Table V, there are, in total, 9 types of 
attack in the NSL-KDD dataset. In the training dataset, there 
are 5 types of attack present: back, apache2, neptune, 
portsweep and saint whilst 8 types of attack: back, apache2, 
neptune, portsweep, ipsweep, satan, nmap and phf are in the 
testing dataset. It can be seen that 4 out of 8 types of attack 
“ipsweep, satan, nmap and phf” in the testing dataset are new 
attacks, which are not available in the training dataset. Among 
all the attack traffic present in the testing data, our proposed 
ensemble approach successfully recognised 99.10% instances 
of attack traffic. The attack type with the highest detection 
rate is DoS with 99.75%, followed by Probe with 54.83% and 
the lowest is the R2L with 16.67%. As a result of further 
investigation, the poor performance of R2L was determined to 
be due to the feature named “dest_host_diff_srv_rate”, which 
contains similar values with the feature of normal traffic, thus 
the classifier is overly keen to recognise R2L attacks as 
normal traffic. In addition, since the connection of R2L and 
normal is similar, it is almost impossible for the system to 
distinguish between these two classes. 
TABLE VI: Detection result derived by proposed approach for UNSW-NB15 
testing set 
Additionally, R2L attacks occur when an attacker has tried 
to gain unauthorised access to a local machine, thus the 
relevant kind of traffic seems legitimate which makes it 
difficult for the system to recognise it as an attack. Meanwhile 
for the Probe attack type, the main cause of the low detection 
percentage is brought about by the three new attack types 
which only exist in the testing dataset. Although we have not 
been able to recognise all three new attack types, it is worth 
Attack 
Category 
Attack 
Name 
 
Attack 
Traffic in 
the Training 
Dataset 
Attack 
Traffic in 
the 
Testing 
Dataset 
Attack 
Traffic 
Detected 
by 
Proposed 
Approach 
 
%age 
of 
Detect
ed 
Attack 
traffic 
DOS 
back 203 1112 1112 
99.75 apache2 434 302 301 
neptune 44 1334 1328 
PROBE 
portsweep 1 16 11 
54.83 
ipsweep - 7 0 
satan - 7 6 
nmap - 1 0 
saint 1 - - 
R2L phf - 6 1 16.67 
Total - 682 2,785 2,759 100 
Data
set 
Back
door 
Fuzzers Reco
nnais
sance 
Explo
its 
Anal
ysis 
DoS Wor
ms 
Ge
ner
ic 
Train
ing 
insta
nces 
9 251 470 2804 - 493 34 213 
Testi
ng 
insta
nces 
83 836 1603 8677 558 1216 114 289 
Dete
ction 
Rate 
(%) 
100 80.98 98.75 94.33 6.63 87.5 99.12 91 
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mentioning that we successfully recognised one of the new 
attack types, (satan) in 85.71% of occurrences clearly 
indicating that our proposed ensemble approach is capable of 
detecting unknown attacks with good performance. 
Table VI presents the attack traffic tabulated for both the 
training and testing datasets along with the results obtained 
using our approach on the UNSW-NB15 dataset. As 
mentioned in [Section IV, A] this dataset is comprised of real 
normal traffic combined with a variety of imbalanced 
synthetic attack traffic, which results in this dataset being 
more challenging to evaluate. In the training dataset, there are 
7 types of attack present: backdoor, fuzzers, reconnaissance, 
exploits, dos, worms and generic whilst 8 types of attack: 
backdoor, fuzzers, reconnaissance, exploits, analysis, DoS, 
worms and generic are in the testing dataset. As can be seen, 
the main difference between the testing data and the training 
data is that it contains a new attack type named “analysis”. 
Our proposed ensemble approach successfully obtained an 
89.75% detection rate among all attack traffic existing in the 
testing dataset.   
The attack type with the highest detection rate is backdoor 
with 100% detection, followed by worms with 99.12%, 
reconnaissance with 98.75%, exploits with 94.33%, generic 
with 91%, dos with 87.5%, fuzzers with 80.98% and the 
lowest is analysis with 6.63%. The results show that with 
respect to five out of eight types of attack, our approach 
achieved a detection rate of more than 90%. The low detection 
rate of “analysis” is due to the unavailability of samples 
residing in the training dataset, which make it difficult for the 
system to classify it as an attack. In spite of achieving the 
lowest detection rate, the system is still able to recognise 
“analysis” 6.63% of the time. 
TABLE VII: Performance comparisons obtained by the proposed method and 
other previous work on KDD and NSL-KDD as reported in [48] 
TABLE VIII: Performance comparisons obtained by the proposed method 
with other approaches on UNSW-NB15 as reported in [34]. 
Classifiers Accuracy 
rate %age 
False alarm 
rate %age 
DT 85.56 15.78 
LR 83.15 18.48 
NB 82.07 18.56 
ANN 81.34 21.13 
EM clustering 78.47 23.79 
Proposed Method 90.33 8.22 
 
  Tables VII and VIII show the performance of our 
proposed method in terms of FAR, DR and ACC and 
compared to the previous methods tested on the KDD and 
NSL-KDD datasets as reported in [48]. For the UNSW-NB15 
dataset, it should be noted that since this dataset is recently 
published, there are a limited number of research experiments 
conducted using it. As such, the obtained results derived from 
our method compare favourably with five techniques 
including: DT, LR, NB, ANN and EM clustering as published 
in [34]. The best results are highlighted in boldface font. It 
needs to be mentioned that the reported result comparisons are 
for reference only due to the fact that comprehensive 
resemblance is not an easy task as different researchers have 
used different proportions of traffic types, sampling methods, 
computational time and pre-processing methods. In most 
cases, the comprehensive comparison becomes more difficult 
since these details are not provided. As presented in Tables 
VII and VIII, although our proposed approach achieves better 
performances in most of the cases, it cannot be claimed that 
the proposed method outperformed others in terms of 
performance. Nevertheless, our proposed approach does show 
some ability with a robust performance in detecting unknown 
attack traffic, which did not exist in the training dataset. 
 
 TABLE X: Comparison of FAR, DR and ACC with other six algorithms in 
UNSW-NB15 dataset 
 
Methods	   Featu
re	  
Selec
tion	  
Feat
ures	  
Nor
mal	  
(%)	  
Do
S	  
(%)	  
Pro
be	  
(%)	  
R2L	  
(%)	  
U2
R	  
(%)	  
Detec
tion	  
Rate	  
(%)	  
Fals
e	  
Alar
m	  
Rat
e	  
(%)	  
ACC	  [39]	   Yes	   N/A	   98.8	   97.
3	  
87.
5	  
12.
6	  
30.
7	  
N/A	   N/A	  
GP	  
Transfor
mation	  
Function	  
[40]	  
No	   41	   99.9
3	  
98.
81	  
97.
29	  
45.
2	  
80.
22	  
N/A	   N/A	  
Hierarchic
al	   SOM	  
[41]	  
No	   41	   98.4	   96.
9	  
67.
6	  
7.3	   15.
7	  
90.6	   1.57	  
MOGFIDS	  
[42]	  
Yes	   25	   98.3
6	  
97.
20	  
88.
59	  
15.
78	  
11.
01	  
92.76	   N/A	  
Multinom
inal	   Naïve	  
Bayes	  
[43]	  
No	   41	   N/A	   N/
A	  
N/
A	  
N/
A	  
N/
A	  
96.5	   3.0	  
GHSOM-­‐
MOF	  [44]	  
Yes	   29	   N/A	   N/
A	  
N/
A	  
N/
A	  
N/
A	  
99.12	   2.24	  
N-­‐KPCA-­‐
SVM	  [45]	  
Yes	   N/A	   N/A	   N/
A	  
N/
A	  
N/
A	  
N/
A	  
95.26	   1.03	  
OS-­‐LEM	  
[46]	  
Yes	   21	   99.0
7	  
99.
14	  
90.
35	  
78.
10	  
56.
75	  
97.67	   1.74	  
TVCPSO-­‐
SVM	  [47]	  
Yes	   17	   99.1
3	  
98.
84	  
89.
29	  
67.
84	  
40.
38	  
97.03	   0.87	  
Ramp-­‐
KSVCR	  
[48]	  
No	   41	   99.1
4	  
99.
49	  
93.
58	  
91.
09	  
68.
75	  
98.48	   0.86	  
Proposed	  
Method	  
Yes	   10	   99.8
2	  
99.
75	  
54.
83	  
16.
67	  
N/
A	  
99.10	   0.18	  
Algorithms Model 
Build 
(sec) 
Detection 
Time 
(sec) 
False 
Alarm 
Rate 
(%) 
Detection 
Rate (%) 
Accuracy 
(%) 
Naïve 
Bayes (NB) 0.02 0.11 19.18 42.73 53.61 
Support 
Vector 
Machine 
(SVM) 
      3.89 7.37 32.55 87.00 87.41 
Multi Layer 
Perceptron 
(MLP) 
      2.60 0.08 6.50 53.43 64.86 
Decision 
Tree (J48) 0.06 0.04 6.68 88.23 89.68 
Random 
Forests 
(RF) 
0.14 0.06 7.89 89.32 90.11 
Adaboost + 
Random 
Forests 
(RF) 
1.66 0.74 8.30 89.71 90.27 
Logitboost 
+ Random 
Forests 
(RF) 
1.72 0.65 8.22 89.75 90.33 
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TABLE IX: Comparison of FAR, DR and ACC with other six algorithms in 
NSL-KDD dataset 
In addition, it should be noted that we evaluated the 
performance of the proposed approach with some eminent 
state-of-the-art data mining algorithms used in IDSs. Tables 
IX and X display a comparison of performance metrics 
between our proposed approach and six other data mining 
algorithms previously used by researchers in IDSs: Naïve 
Bayes [17], Support Vector Machine [19], Multilayer 
Perceptron [20], Decision Tree [21], Random Forests [22] and 
Adaboost [28]. Five single classifiers are evaluated 
individually in terms of the time taken to build classification 
models, detection time, false alarm rate, detection rate and 
accuracy rate to choose a better combination for the 
Logitboost classifier as shown in Tables IX and X. This is a 
crucial aspect of our research because the algorithm choice 
needs to be further re-classified with ensemble approaches for 
better detection performance.  
In the NSL-KDD dataset, RF had shown comparable 
performance in terms of the accuracy, detection rate and false 
alarm rate. Although J48 had shown a faster detection time by 
50% over RF, the detection and accuracy rate achieved by RF 
is slightly better than J48. Meanwhile, in the UNSW-NB15 
dataset, RF outperformed every single other classifier by 
achieving 90.11% detection accuracy. Thus, in our proposed 
detection approach, we chose RF as a base classifier to 
ensemble with the Logitboost classifier for both the NSL-
KDD and UNSW-NB15 datasets. 
Fig. 6. Comparison of performance algorithms in NSL-KDD 
dataset
 
Fig. 7. Comparison of performance algorithms in UNSW-
NB15 dataset 
Additionally, a further experiment is performed for fair 
comparison of our proposed boosting algorithm with the 
Adaboost boosting algorithm. As presented in Fig. 6 and 7, 
our proposed approach shows slightly better performance in 
terms of detection rate and accuracy rate over Adaboost with 
0.46% and 0.1% and with 0.21% and 0.06% for NSL-KDD 
and UNSW-NB15 datasets respectively. From the 
aforementioned results, we conclude that our algorithm 
provides a comparable detection accuracy rate with a low 
false alarm rate, which is the most crucial property of IDSs in 
practice. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
There have been numerous anomaly intrusion detection 
studies conducted in the past. Nevertheless, achieving 
exceptionally low false alarm rates with high attack 
recognition capabilities for unseen attacks remains a major 
challenge. In this paper we have presented the Logitboost-
based classifier for detecting known and unknown web attack 
traffic. The proposed approach was evaluated using two 
publicly available labelled intrusion detection evaluation 
datasets NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15 to allow different 
integration testing environments. In pre-processing, redundant 
and irrelevant features were filtered-out to obtain the most 
prominent features. Following that, we employed a data 
mining approach using the Logitboost classifier algorithm to 
achieve high detection accuracy while preserving a low false 
alarm rate. The experimental results have demonstrated that 
our proposed ensemble approach has successfully recognised 
some unknown attacks and achieved comparable performance 
with other established state-of-the-art IDS algorithms. Moving 
forward, the final successful results will be transformed into 
signatures and stored inside a database. By doing this, 
detection time can be drastically reduced, since the new entry 
traffic can be matched with benign/malicious signatures 
generated from previous detection. Finally, the proposed 
ensemble approach can be evaluated online using larger, as 
well as the latest, encrypted traffic. 
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